There are moments in the life of a republic when political debate moves beyond taxes, programs, and ideology and confronts a more fundamental question:
Who controls the territory?
For any functioning state, the answer must be clear: the government, acting under the Constitution and the law.
Colombia knows what happens when that principle breaks down. For decades, guerrillas, paramilitary organizations, drug traffickers, criminal gangs, and other armed groups have sought to occupy spaces that constitutionally belong to the state.
Under Gustavo Petro, the government placed “Total Peace”—including negotiations, ceasefires, and dialogue with armed organizations—at the center of its security strategy. Critics argued that the approach weakened deterrence and allowed criminal groups to expand their influence.
The government of Abelardo de la Espriella is taking a different approach.
Its message is straightforward: the Colombian state will reclaim and defend its authority throughout the national territory.
That is why the American expression “The New Sheriff in Town” fits the moment.
The metaphor comes from the American Old West: when law and order collapse, a sheriff arrives and makes clear that the law will once again be enforced.
That image comes to mind when watching President De La Espriella personally oversee Public Force operations in Santa Marta.
But the deeper question is constitutional:
Can a president use the full authority of the state against armed groups that challenge it?
Yes—provided that authority is exercised within the Constitution and the law.
AUTHORITY IS NOT AUTHORITARIANISM
Colombia’s 1991 Constitution did not establish a government powerless to defend itself.
Article 189 makes the President responsible for directing the Public Force and serving as its Supreme Commander. It also charges the President with maintaining public order throughout the national territory and restoring it when it has been disrupted.
The Constitutional Court has recognized broad presidential authority to determine the measures necessary to preserve public order, including coercive measures and the legitimate use of force, subject to constitutional safeguards.
That distinction matters.
State authority is not the opposite of freedom. It is one of the conditions that makes freedom possible.
A citizen is not truly free if criminals can extort him simply for going to work.
Property rights mean little if an armed group decides who may occupy a territory.
Freedom of movement disappears when criminals determine which roads citizens may use.
And the rule of law is hollow if a criminal organization can order an entire city to close its businesses—and the government cannot or will not stop it.
A free society requires a state capable of protecting it.
SI VIS PACEM, PARA BELLUM
The Romans understood the principle more than two thousand years ago:
“Si vis pacem, para bellum.”
If you want peace, prepare for war.
The point is not to glorify war. It is to establish deterrence.
A country that cannot defend itself invites those who believe violence can defeat institutions.
Peace is more than the absence of gunfire.
It means that merchants can open their stores without paying extortion. Farmers can work without answering to an illegal commander. Families can travel without fear of criminal checkpoints. Citizens can live their lives without asking permission from armed groups.
That requires a state with greater legitimate power than those who seek to replace it.
A modern republic therefore needs:
- A capable military.
- An effective police force.
- Professional intelligence services.
- An independent justice system.
- Secure borders.
- Effective prisons.
- And political leadership willing to use these instruments lawfully when necessary.
Peace without the capacity to defend it is vulnerability.
SEPTEMBER: THE STATE PUSHES BACK
In September, the government’s security doctrine moved from rhetoric to operations.
According to government reports:
- Operation Azarías, targeting dissident armed groups in Guaviare, resulted in 24 deaths, six captures, the rescue of one minor, and the seizure of 35 weapons.
- Operation Amón in El Peñol, Nariño, reportedly resulted in seven members of criminal organizations killed and five captured.
- In La Guajira, authorities reported the death of alias “Bendito Menor,” identified as a member of the Conquering Self-Defense Forces of the Sierra Nevada.
- In Santa Marta, following an operation against alias “Cholo,” identified as the organization’s second-in-command, a criminal group attempted to respond with an armed strike.
The government responded by deploying the Public Force and strengthening security operations in the city.
The message was simple:
Criminal organizations do not decide when Colombian cities open or close. The state does.
Citizens do not need permission from criminals to work.
Business owners do not need permission to open their stores.
And the Colombian Republic does not need permission to exercise its authority on Colombian soil.
THE DOCTRINE OF AUTHORITY
This is not a new idea.
From Aristotle to the American and European constitutional traditions, political thought has recognized that a political community requires legitimate authority to survive.
There is nothing inherently controversial about saying that:
- Order matters.
- Security matters.
- National defense matters.
- Property rights matter.
- Economic freedom, family life, and national sovereignty require security.
When the state abandons these responsibilities, the vacuum does not remain empty.
Someone else fills it.
Usually, that someone is the strongest armed actor.
That is why reclaiming territory is more than a security policy.
It is the restoration of constitutional government.
FROM NEGOTIATION TO ENFORCEMENT
This is the central difference between Petro’s “Total Peace” strategy and the approach now associated with De La Espriella.
Petro’s government emphasized negotiations, ceasefires, and dialogue with armed organizations.
The De La Espriella government has emphasized territorial recovery, Public Force operations, the capture of criminal leaders, disruption of criminal economies, drug interdiction, and extradition.
The strategic premise is different.
Negotiation seeks to persuade an armed adversary to abandon violence.
Deterrence seeks to ensure that the adversary understands the consequences of confronting the state.
That does not mean seeking war.
It means making clear that the state has the capacity to enforce its laws.
Deterrence is not the absence of peace. It can be one of the conditions that makes peace possible.
THE STATE MUST BE STRONGER THAN CRIME
According to the government’s September 13 report, during the first 36 days of the administration there were more than 17,000 arrests, 24 criminal leaders affected, 1,761 weapons seized, more than 75 tons of drugs seized, and nearly 100 extraditions signed.
Those figures are government-reported figures and should be understood in that context.
But the broader policy shift is clear: security has returned to the center of the government’s agenda.
The stated objectives are equally clear:
Reclaim territory. Pursue criminal leaders. Dismantle criminal economies. Fight drug trafficking. Protect civilians.
A constitutional government cannot permanently defer to armed organizations while negotiating the terms of its own authority.
The state must be capable of enforcing the law.
STRONG GOVERNMENT, LIMITED BY LAW
A strong state is not the same thing as an unlimited state.
In fact, the strength of a constitutional government lies precisely in its ability to exercise power while remaining bound by law.
The President may order operations.
The Public Force may confront armed organizations.
Courts must review legality.
Prosecutors must investigate.
And citizens retain their constitutional rights.
That balance is the essence of constitutional government.
The law limits government power; it does not require governmental paralysis.
The Constitution does not demand that the state remain passive in the face of organized crime.
It requires the state to act lawfully.
EXTRADITION AND SOVEREIGNTY
Organized crime does not respect national borders.
Neither should the fight against it.
Extradition and international cooperation are therefore essential tools of modern law enforcement.
For Colombia, cooperation with the United States and other democratic partners is particularly important in confronting drug trafficking, money laundering, weapons trafficking, and transnational criminal organizations.
International cooperation is not a surrender of sovereignty.
Used properly, it can strengthen sovereignty.
A secure republic does not fear cooperation.
A sovereign republic knows why it cooperates.
COLOMBIA HAS A NEW SHERIFF
The Colombian debate should reject a false choice between freedom and security.
Security protects freedom.
Nor must Colombia choose between peace and legitimate force.
A country needs the capacity to defend peace if peace is to endure.
And Colombia need not choose between democracy and authority.
Democracy requires legitimate institutions capable of exercising authority throughout the territory.
The peace that matters to a republic is not the peace of fear.
It is not peace imposed by a guerrilla’s rifle.
It is not peace purchased through extortion.
It is not the peace of a business owner forced to close because a criminal organization issued a threat.
It is the peace of a citizen protected by the state.
That is why the Roman principle remains relevant:
Si vis pacem, para bellum.
If you want peace, prepare to defend it.
Colombia does not exist to negotiate away its sovereignty.
The state exists to exercise legitimate authority, enforce the law, protect its citizens, and defend the constitutional order.
And one principle should remain non-negotiable in any republic:
No armed group can be more powerful than the state. No criminal can stand above the law. And no Colombian territory should be governed by anyone other than the Colombian Republic.
That is the meaning of “The New Sheriff in Town.”
THE RETURN OF AUTHORITY
This article has been authored by Jorge Alberto Valencia
Jorge Alberto Valencia Guevara, J.D., is an international attorney, corporate consultant, and geopolitical analyst with more than two decades of experience across the United States, Hispanic America, and Europe. He holds a Juris Doctor from the University of Miami School of Law and specialized credentials in global diplomacy from the University of London.
He serves as Director of the Transactional Department at Alianza Law Firm, PLLC, and President of Valencia Consulting Group, LLC, in Miami. His practice focuses on cross-border transactions, international commercial law, foreign direct investment, and corporate expansion, complemented by executive leadership in the energy and telecommunications infrastructure sectors.
He is also a historian, author, and academic who serves on institutional boards, teaches medieval Spanish history and U.S. law, and regularly provides international geopolitical analysis for radio and television.
About The Author
