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Performance and Positioning Review – FY 2025

Through year-end 2025, McIntyre Partnerships’ results were approximately 8% gross and 6% net. This compares to our benchmark, the Russell 2000 Value, which increased ~13%. The fund’s trailing five-year returns are ~24% gross and ~19% net per annum, which compares to our benchmark’s return of ~15% per annum. Since inception, the fund has returned ~17% gross and ~13% net per annum, compared to our benchmark’s return of ~7% per annum. Please note that a small residual side-pocket investment was paid out in Q4, which may affect partner statements.

In the winners column, SHC and FTRE contributed >500bps, while GTX, SPHR, and Stock A contributed 100-500bps. In the losers column, LESL, SEG, and STRZ lost 100-500bps.

2025 was a choppy, frustrating year that in the end finished “alright” – not one for the record books, but not awful either. While these years are not my favorites, I consider them an inevitable part of our strategy. We are not short-term traders, and our investments often require multiple years to be proven out. I believe our ~10% per annum of gross outperformance since inception speaks to this. If in our worst years we earn mid-single-digit returns and in our best we achieve >45% returns, as we have had for a third of the time since inception, we will do just fine over time.

Further, beneath the surface, I believe our portfolio substantially improved in 2025 due to new ideas and a significant rotation from gainers to laggards. Among our new ideas, the most important is Stock A, which is now our largest holding. I believe the investment offers multibagger upside over the next few years with minimal risk of permanent loss. Despite its importance to the portfolio, I am still considering a larger investment. I will not provide public comment until I am sure we are no longer adding. In addition, despite modest portfolio-level returns, several investments rallied substantially, while others declined sharply. I have rotated our capital from winners, where I think value is fairly reflected, to those where things are improving yet the share price actually fell. I believe this sets us up for strong returns in 2026.

In the laggard category, STHO and SEG had strong operational years and made substantial progress toward realizing the value of their underlying assets, yet their share prices declined ~15% and ~29%, respectively. I discuss the investments in our portfolio review, but for less liquid investments, it is not uncommon for the share price to drift materially from the underlying asset value until a large catalyst, such as a dividend or FCF inflection, is announced. I consider their share declines a substantial opportunity and have increased our holdings. I was able to fund these additional purchases by reducing our positions in long-held investments SHC, GTX, and SPHR, all of which saw significant share price appreciation, rallying 29%, 93%, and 106%, respectively. While all three delivered strong 2025 results, none are growing as much as their shares have returned, and the multiple expansion has brought them closer to fair value, particularly for GTX and SPHR. We retain a large, albeit reduced, position in SHC and no longer hold significant positions in GTX and SPHR.

In conversations with many of you, I have lately been referring to our portfolio as “cranking a spring” – you might not be able to see it yet, but the tension is rising. If my analysis is correct, our portfolio is as well-positioned as at any point in our history. Time will tell.

Portfolio Review – Exposures and Concentration

At month-end, our exposures are 117% long, 16% short, and 101% net. Adjusted for our options hedges, the portfolio is approximately 97% net long. Our five largest positions are Stock A, SHC, STHO, MDRX, and SEG, and account for roughly 76% of assets.

Portfolio Review – Existing Positions

Sotera Health (SHC)

SHC’s stock was volatile in 2025 but ultimately finished strong. Despite the share price volatility, SHC remains a predictable, growing, and recession-proof business. These are exactly the attributes we look for in a core holding. Here are the company’s financials over the last few years:

Despite the noise, the core business remains a stable franchise that has consistently grown sales and operating profits with zero down years in the last 20 years.

Further, 2025 marked an inflection year, with the core Sterigenics segment posting 10% revenue growth, up from ~4-7% in the previous two years. This inflection was driven by Sterigenics finally lapping the inventory destocking that hospitals and distributors saw following COVID-19 hoarding, which lifted volumes from flat to ~5% growth. With destocking in the rearview mirror, SHC is well positioned to return to its historical 10%+ EBITDA growth rate, which is above Street estimates and, I believe, represents a significant catalyst.

In addition, SHC should benefit from the tax law changes in the OBIB Act. SHC has been paying a ~34% tax rate because the 2017 tax law lowered the interest deductibility cap from 30% of EBITDA to 30% of EBIT in 2022. The new tax law restores deductibility to EBITDA, which, combined with SHC’s growth and debt paydown, will reduce SHC’s tax rate to the mid-twenties. However, despite the change in the law, the Street still models SHC’s tax rate around 32%. When SHC reports, I anticipate guidance confirming the lowered tax rate, which should boost EPS estimates by ~10%.

SHC also saw solid developments on the legal front. They continued to make progress and settled numerous cases in line with previous settlements. Further, SHC saw a significant number of cases dismissed in Georgia for failure to prove causation, which should reduce the future value of settlements in the state. While I anticipate SHC will continue to face litigation and pay settlements, I believe the largest settlements are behind them, and further settlements, like the $31MM in April 2025, are minor bumps rather than material headwinds.

Despite improved volumes, changes in tax law, and positive legal developments, SHC remains at a material discount to STE, the other side of their sterilization duopoly. For comparison, STE trades ~25x 2026 EPS and 21x 2027 EPS, versus SHC at 17x and 14x my estimates, respectively. Given the inflecting growth and discount to peers, we retain a large position. I believe our investment is positioned to benefit from SHC’s ~10% EBITDA growth per year, continuing capital returns, and potential multiple expansion. I value SHC at 25x my 2027 EPS estimate of $1.20, implying a $30 valuation versus its current $17 price.

Star Holdings (STHO)

STHO is a liquidating security in which the fund has been invested since 2023. Its primary assets are 13.3MM SAFE shares and liquidating real estate in Asbury Park and Richmond. Please refer to prior letters for a detailed description of their assets. It is a very low-liquidity security, where the stock’s price and fundamental value can move in opposite directions purely due to liquidity. After several years with minimal updates from the company, I believe that has happened here. However, STHO has made significant progress toward liquidation over the past three years, and I believe the company will announce significant capital returns in 2026.

When it was spun off from its former parent, iStar, now called Safehold (SAFE), STHO was envisioned as a three- to five-year liquidation, with certain hard-to-sell assets placed in the spinco to simplify the larger company’s investment story. We are now entering year four of this plan. These assets were not spun because they were troubled, as is typical in “bad bank” spins, but rather because they were real estate developments that do not match SAFE’s mandate to invest in ground leases. Since the spin, STHO has made significant progress, realizing sales of ~$170MM of real estate versus their book value of ~$120MM. STHO now holds only $113MM of land for development, down from $224MM at the time of spin. Further, public filings in Asbury Park indicate that several land parcels have been optioned by large builders such as Hovnanian and Toll Brothers, yet they remain on STHO’s balance sheet. I anticipate most of these lots will move towards construction in 2026. STHO has also substantially reduced the management fee owed to SAFE, from ~$55MM at the time of spin to ~$10MM today. To facilitate these asset sales, STHO engaged in numerous seller financings. While initially a drain on cash, STHO has successfully recuperated all of these when due, and I anticipate several key repayments in 2026, including the elimination of the Surfhouse JV, which has made STHO’s financials difficult to understand. These actions have substantially strengthened STHO’s balance sheet. At year-end 2025, I calculate STHO’s cash and readily marketable bond investments at ~$94MM versus their credit facility at $115MM.

Which brings us to STHO’s largest and most important asset – its 13.3MM SAFE shares. At the time of the spin, STHO had significant asset value but limited cash. To safely capitalize the spinco, management spun it with shares of the parent company, SAFE, which could be sold if needed. As I calculate STHO at ~$21MM of net debt, versus my expectations for >$50MM of cash flow from loan repayments and asset sales in 2026, the logic for maintaining their significant SAFE stake is weakening. I anticipate STHO announcing either a spin or sale of their SAFE shares in 2026, along with a repayment or restructuring of their existing credit facility. As STHO’s SAFE shares have a current value of ~$120MM, net of a $91MM margin loan, a distribution to shareholders would be ~$10 per share, versus STHO’s current $8 price.

While some investors may question whether management is committed to returning capital, hence the discount in STHO’s shares, I have had positive discussions with management. They are also significant shareholders. CEO Jay Sugarman owns ~4% of shares outstanding. More importantly, STHO is already returning capital to shareholders via share buybacks. In 2025, STHO repurchased ~9% of shares outstanding.

If STHO continues to make progress and returns capital to shareholders, I believe our ultimate realization for STHO should be $20-$30/sh. versus a current price of $8.

Seaport Entertainment Group (SEG)

SEG is a holding company with a variety of assets spun out of Howard Hughes (HHH) as a “bad bank.” Its most important assets are its holdings in the Seaport district of Lower Manhattan and approximately $15 in net cash per share. Please refer to our Q3 2024 letter for a more in-depth discussion of SEG’s individual assets.

2025 was a busy year for SEG. The two most important developments were the sale of 250 Water Street and the signing of Meow Wolf as an anchor tenant. 250 Water Street is a mixed residential and commercial property that HHH spent over ten years developing. While I expect the buyer to do well on this purchase, Manhattan construction and condo sales are significantly beyond SEG management’s expertise in entertainment assets, and I was pleased to see the sale price in line with my estimated value. As a result of the sale, I calculate SEG’s net cash at $15 per share, which is closer to $18/sh. at the holdco level, ignoring $3 of non-recourse debt. This compares to SEG’s current price of ~$20. While I expect further expenses for tenant improvements and the redevelopment of certain SEG-operated properties to reduce net cash to ~$10/sh. over the next 18 months, SEG’s significant cash holdings provide solid downside protection for our investment.

The second large development was SEG’s signing of Meow Wolf as an anchor tenant for the Seaport. For those unfamiliar, Meow Wolf is a museum/entertainment concept that has had significant success in markets like Las Vegas, Houston, and Denver. Its location in Las Vegas is rumored to welcome over one million tourists per year. Meow Wolf is taking approximately 15% of the available space in the Seaport. More importantly, SEG is replacing low-density office leases and previously empty space with a major traffic driver. The Seaport is a beautiful, recently finished development, but as my fellow New Yorkers know, it is a bit “out of the way.” This has resulted in lower traffic and, consequently, lower rents than HHH envisioned when they began construction. Meow Wolf is in and of itself a destination – how many times are you strolling down the street and bop into a museum? – thus it makes an ideal tenant. Furthermore, the traffic Meow Wolf drives should be a significant boon to the restaurants surrounding the Seaport, most of which are either owned by SEG or tenants in SEG real estate. I believe the opening of Meow Wolf, slated for H2 2027, will be a transformational event for SEG. In the meantime, SEG is cash-rich and making steady improvements in its other properties, albeit with worse results at its largest concept, the Tin Building, than I predicted 12 months ago.

Once Meow Wolf opens and the surrounding properties are fully leased, I believe SEG can drive rental income of ~$50MM. A 6.5% cap rate, plus credit for cash and other assets, would support a share price of $70 or better.

Veradigm (MDRX)

After a previously discussed successful trade in 2024, MDRX again became a top-five position for the partnership following a failed sales process in Q1 2025. At the time of repurchase in Q1 2025, I wrote:

“I believe the path forward is relatively straightforward: finish the audits, relist the shares in 2026, and then look to return cash to shareholders and/or sell the company if the market does not properly value it. MDRX is presently $4 with $1/sh. in net cash, $1/sh. in other investments, and should generate $0.50-$0.70/sh. in adjusted FCF in a normal year. In a deal with a strategic buyer, I believe $120MM in synergies, or 20% of sales, could be achieved. This would add another $1/sh. in FCF. Once MDRX relists, I believe this math supports a takeout over $10. If not, I am happy to indefinitely collect our ~30% FCF/EV yield on a stable, sticky healthcare software business.”

Frankly, very little has changed since then, and very little has changed in my thesis. While many formerly high-flying SaaS companies are down >30% YTD in 2026, the SaaS index trades at ~4-5x EV/Sales versus MDRX at ~0.7x EV/Sales. Whatever AI-related fears are in the market, I believe they are more than reflected in MDRX’s valuation. Furthermore, I believe EHRs, which have significant legal and privacy requirements, regulatory complexity, and are mission-critical to doctors’ offices, will be among the least affected software in the next five years. MDRX’s recent earnings report was broadly in line with my assumptions, albeit a tad light on cash generation, primarily due to ongoing expenses related to the restatement. Critically, management still expects to become current and relist in 2026. When they do, I believe shares will trade at 15x my normalized $0.50-$0.70 in FCF/sh, which, giving credit for net cash, would yield $7-$11 versus a current price of $4.50. If management successfully reinvigorates sales growth and/or the company is sold to a strategic acquirer, I believe further upside exists.

Business Updates

Throughout 2025, our portfolio’s liquidity improved significantly. As a result, I plan to reopen the fund to outside investors in H2 2026. However, we have already received indications of interest and are only planning a limited marketing window. At present, the firm’s AUM is approximately $75MM. Once we cross $150MM, I plan to increase our minimum to $5MM and limit our raise to 25% of AUM per annum. As always, existing LPs will be given priority. Potentially interested outside parties are encouraged to reach out in advance of our reopening.

As always, please feel free to contact me with any questions.

Sincerely,

Chris McIntyre

McIntyre Partnerships Returns⁽¹⁾

	QTD	YTD	1-YEAR	3-YEAR	5-YEAR	SINCE INCEPTION
GROSS OF FEES	6.6%	7.5%	7.5%	17.7%	24.0%	16.8%
NET OF FEES	6.0%	5.6%	5.6%	13.7%	19.2%	12.8%
RUSSELL 2000 VALUE	3.3%	12.6%	12.6%	11.6%	8.9%	7.0%
RUSSELL 2000 INDEX	2.2%	12.8%	12.8%	13.7%	6.0%	8.4%

(1) The returns presented on page 1 from January through August 2017 represent the performance results of a personal proprietary trading account managed by the Founder with a strategy similar to the strategy of the Fund. This information is presented for illustrative purposes only, the above results do not reflect the actual results of the Fund or the composition of its portfolio. From September 2017 onwards, returns are from the Fund. All net returns are calculated using a 1.5% management fee, 20% incentive fee, and 5% hard hurdle. Performance of individual investors may vary based upon differing management fee and incentive fee arrangements, and the timing of contributions and withdrawals. Performance numbers and other portfolio data were prepared by McIntyre Capital GP, LLC, the general partner of the Fund (the “General Partner”), and have not been compiled, reviewed, or audited by an independent accountant. Returns are subject to future adjustment and revision. The information provided is historical and is not a guide to future performance. This document cannot and does not guarantee or predict a similar outcome with respect to any future investment.

References to market or composite indices or benchmarks such as the Russell 2000 Value, S&P 500, or other measures of relative market performance over a specified period of time are provided for informational purposes only. Reference or comparison to an index or a fund that seeks to track a particular index does not imply that the portfolio will be constructed in the same way as the index or such fund or that it will achieve returns, volatility, or other results similar to the index or such fund. Comparisons between the Fund or assets to be held by the Fund and the performance of indices or benchmarks are for informational purposes only. The investment program of the Fund does not mirror the investment program of these indices, funds, or similar indices or funds, and the volatility and performance results of the Fund may be materially different than the volatility and performance results of such indices or funds.

This presentation is not an offer to sell securities of any investment fund or a solicitation of offers to buy any such securities. Securities of McIntyre Partnerships, LP, a Delaware limited partnership (“ McIntyre Partnerships ” or the “ Fund ”), and McIntyre Partnerships (Cayman) Ltd., a Cayman Islands exempted company (“ McIntyre Partnerships (Cayman) ” and together with McIntyre Partnerships, the “ Funds ”), each managed by McIntyre Capital Management, LP (the “ Investment Manager ” or “ McIntyre Capital ”) are offered to selected investors only by means of a complete offering memorandum, limited partnership agreement (in the case of McIntyre Partnerships), memorandum and articles of association (in the case of McIntyre Partnerships (Cayman)), and related subscription materials which contain significant additional information about the terms of an investment in the Funds (such documents, the “ Offering Documents ”). Any decision to invest must be based solely upon the information set forth in the Offering Documents, regardless of any information investors may have been otherwise furnished, including this presentation.

An investment in any strategy, including the strategy described herein, involves a high degree of risk. There is no guarantee that the investment objective will be achieved. Past performance of these strategies is not necessarily indicative of future results. There is the possibility of loss and all investment involves risk including the loss of principal. Securities of the Funds are not registered with any regulatory authority, are offered pursuant to exemptions from such registration, and are subject to significant restrictions.

The information in this presentation was prepared by the General Partner and is believed by the General Partner to be reliable and has been obtained from public sources believed to be reliable. General Partner makes no representation as to the accuracy or completeness of such information. Opinions, estimates and projections in this presentation constitute the current judgment of General Partner and are subject to change without notice. Any projections, forecasts and estimates contained in this presentation are necessarily speculative in nature and are based upon certain assumptions. It can be expected that some or all of such assumptions will not materialize or will vary significantly from actual results. Accordingly, any projections are only estimates and actual results will differ and may vary substantially from the projections or estimates shown. This presentation is not intended as a recommendation to purchase or sell any commodity or security. The General Partner has no obligation to update, modify or amend this presentation or to otherwise notify a reader thereof in the event that any matter stated herein, or any opinion, projection, forecast or estimate set forth herein, changes or subsequently becomes inaccurate.

The graphs, charts and other visual aids are provided for informational purposes only. None of these graphs, charts or visual aids can and of themselves be used to make investment decisions. No representation is made that these will assist any person in making investment decisions and no graph, chart or other visual aid can capture all factors and variables required in making such decisions.

This presentation is strictly confidential and may not be reproduced or redistributed in whole or in part nor may its contents be disclosed to any other person without the express consent of the General Partner.

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